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ABSTRACT
In this paper we introduce an iterative voting algorithm and
then use it to obtain a rating method which is very ro-
bust against collusion attacks as well as random and biased
raters. Unlike the previous iterative methods, our method is
not based on comparing submitted evaluations to an approx-
imation of the final rating scores, and it entirely decouples
credibility assessment of the cast evaluations from the rank-
ing itself. The convergence of our algorithm relies on the
existence of a fixed point of a continuous mapping which is
also a stationary point of a constrained optimization objec-
tive. We have implemented and tested our rating method
using both simulated data as well as real world data. In
particular, we have applied our method to movie evalua-
tions obtained from MovieLens and compared our results
with IMDb and Rotten Tomatoes movie rating sites. Not
only are the ratings provided by our system very close to
IMDb rating scores, but when we differ from the IMDb rat-
ings, the direction of such differences is essentially always
towards the ratings provided by the critics in Rotten Toma-
toes. Our tests demonstrate high efficiency of our method,
especially for very large online rating systems, for which
trust management is both of the highest importance and
one of the most challenging problems.
1. INTRODUCTION
Human computation is a new model of distributed com-
puting [4,42] in which the computational power of machines
is augmented by the cognitive power of human beings. The
main benefit of such a model comes from the fact that many
problems which are trivial to humans are still intractable for
machines. Human computation has been employed to solve
a wide variety of problems such as spam detection [36], ques-
tion answering [31], tagging photos [35], as well as many
others [10].
E-Commerce is another area in which human computation
has been widely used to assess quality of products as well
as trustworthiness of people. Continuous growth of online
commerce as well as of many other forms of online interac-
tions, crucially depends on trust management. For exam-
ple, in online markets, due to a huge number of potential
sellers with varying reputation as well as a huge number of
available products, sometimes of dubious quality, buyers rely
on the feedback of other customers who have shared their
experiences with the community to help them make their
decisions. One common way of sharing such information
and experiences is through Online Rating Systems. In such
systems, providers (either manufacturers or just sellers) ad-
vertise their products and customers evaluate them based on
their experience of dealing with that particular product or
vendor. Based on such individual evaluations received from
customers, the system determines a rating score for every
product, reflecting the overall quality of the product from
customers’ point of view. Yelp [40], IMDb [15] and Ama-
zon [3] are some of the popular online systems with rating
facilities.
An important issue in these systems is the trustworthiness
of the cast feedback. Many pieces of evidence [12, 16] show
that users may try to manipulate the ratings of products by
casting unfair evaluations. Unfair evaluations are evalua-
tions which are cast regardless of the quality of the product
and usually are given based on personal vested interests of
the users. For example, providers may try to submit sup-
porting feedback to increase the rating of their products and
consequently increase their revenue [12]. The providers also
may attack their competitors by giving low scores in their
feedback on their competitor’s products. Another study
shows that some sellers in eBay boost their reputation un-
fairly by buying or selling feedback [16].
Unfair evaluations are broadly divided into two categories
[34, 39]: (i) individual and (ii) collaborative. Unlike the in-
dividual unfair evaluations, collaborative unfair evaluations,
also called collusion [32,34], are cast by a group of users who
try to manipulate the rating of a product collaboratively.
Collusion, by its nature, is more sophisticated and harder
to deal with than unfair evaluations cast individually [32].
Although detection of unfair evaluations, mainly collu-
sion, has been widely studied in the recent literature [23,
28, 32, 34, 39], some serious challenges remain. Generally,
existing collusion detection techniques rely on either us-
ing temporal and behavioral indicators to identify colluding
groups [23,28] or on continuous monitoring of the behavior
of the system, looking for unusual behavior [38,39].
Identifying colluding groups usually involves looking for
cliques; however, relying on solving or approximating such
NP-hard problems clearly degrades the performance of these
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Figure 1: Rating Through Voting - Method Overview
systems. Heuristic approaches, such as the Frequent Itemset
Mining technique [1] used in [28], do not solve the problem
either, without impacting the accuracy of the system. Tun-
ing indicators or monitoring systems in order to make them
sufficiently sensitive to collusion attacks, without an exces-
sive number of false alarms, can be a daunting task, usually
relying on machine learning techniques. However, preparing
an adequate training dataset for such systems is yet another
serious challenge [28].
Moreover, existing collusion detection systems generally
use local quality metrics, i.e., metrics which are calculated
from a small subset of data, and are thus vulnerable to ma-
nipulation. The more global the metric is, the more ef-
fort is needed to manipulate it. In other words, in order
to manipulate a quality metric which is calculated based on
the behavior of the entire community, one must change the
sentiment of the community; for online communities with
millions of users this might be an intractable task. For ex-
ample, the dependence of the PageRank of any particular
web page on the PageRanks of virtually all other webpages
on the Internet is what makes the PageRank robust against
manipulation [29].
In this paper we propose a method called ‘Rating-through-
Voting’ to help address the above problems. Our method
first reduces the problem of rating of a product to an “elec-
tion”. In such an election, users’ feedback is seen as a vote
on the most appropriate rating level for the product from
a list of a few (usually at most ten) available levels. We
propose an iterative voting algorithm which for each level in
each election list calculates how credible it is to be accepted
as the community sentiment about the product. Using such
calculated credibility degrees, we assign each voter a trust-
worthiness degree reflecting to what extent she has behaved
in accordance with the community sentiment. In the next
round of iteration we employ these trustworthiness ranks to
recalculate such credibility degrees for each level. We iter-
ate this process until it converges, i.e., until new calculated
credibility degrees are sufficiently close to the previous ones.
The convergence of the algorithm is guaranteed with the ex-
istence of a fixed point of a continuous mapping, which also
happens to be a stationary point of a constrained optimiza-
tion objective function.
Such credibility degrees of rating levels are then aggre-
gated into rating scores of products in a fully decoupled
way, allowing the system to choose aggregation method best
suited to the intended application. We have tested our
method both on simulated data involving very large col-
lusion attacks as well as on real world movie rating data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A
general overview of our method along with some basic defi-
nitions is in Section 2. In Section 3 we describe the details of
our voting algorithm and its use for rating (‘Rating-through-
Voting’). In Section 4 we present an application scenario
with its implementation details; in Section 5 we discuss the
evaluation results of our method. Section 6 is devoted to
some of the related work; our conclusions are presented in
Section 7.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Definitions
Since some of our terminology, such as “a voter” or “an
election”, is also used either in everyday English or other
technical fields, we now specify the intended meaning of such
terms as we use them in this paper.
An evaluation is a feedback given by a person on a product.
We call the person who casts the evaluation a rater or a
voter. In order to avoid overusing a term, we may use words
evaluation, vote and feedback synonymously.
An election is the process of choosing one item from a finite
list of items. When we speak about rating through voting,
the election items on a voting list are the possible rating
levels for the quality of a product; for example, 1-10 for
rating movies in IMDb or 1 − 5 to represent quality of a
product in Amazon online market.
Trustworthiness of a voter is a metric which shows to
what extent the voter has been voting in accordance with
the sentiment of the community.
Credibility of a an item on an election list is a metric which
shows the level of community approval of that item.
Rating Score are the scores which are produced by our
system or other systems which we use for comparison pur-
pose to reflect the quality of a product. We may use words
‘rating scores’, ‘scores’ or ‘ranks’ interchangeably to refer to
such scores.
Of course, the precise meaning of the above terms will
become apparent only after we present their technical usage.
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2.2 Method Overview
Our method is based on the idea of reducing rating to
voting. In rating systems we have a list of products to be
rated by a group of users. Every users can express her opin-
ion on the quality of the product by casting an evaluation of
the quality level which describes the best the opinion of the
user. For example, in Figure 1(a), three users have evaluated
a product by casting their evaluations.
In most rating systems the assigned rating score is a (pos-
sibly weighted) average of the cast votes. However, we can
also look at rating process as an election. In such an elec-
tion, the voters are the people who are evaluating the prod-
uct; the candidates are all possible values which a voter can
choose to express her opinion about the product; for exam-
ple, 1 star to indicate a low quality or 5 stars to indicate a
high quality. We will use a technical term ‘an item’ to refer
to such candidates. Our algorithm aims to determine the
winner of such an election in a robust way while reflecting
the prevailing opinion of the community on the quality of
the product. The Figure 1(b) depicts such an election.
Therefore, for each product in the system, we generate
one election and all people who have rated that product are
considered as having voted in the corresponding election. In
a ‘classic election’, the candidate who has received the ma-
jority of the cast votes will be the winner of the election.
However, to make our elections robust against collusion at-
tacks, we evaluate voters based on how their choices are
supported by other community members. The closer the
votes of the voter to some form of a ‘community consen-
sus’, the higher her trust rank is. In aggregating the votes,
rather than considering them all equal, each voter’s vote
has the value equal to the voters trust rank. Such obtained
trust ranks of voters and credibility levels of the candidates
can be now used to compute the rating scores of products.
We do not presuppose any particular method for computing
such rating scores; such computation can be done by freely
choosing a method best suited for the specific application.
In our tests we have used one of many such possible options,
see Section 3.4.
3. RATING-THROUGH-VOTING
3.1 Basic Concepts and Notation
Setup: We will assume that a set of N voters V1, . . . , VN
are given a collection of L lists Λ1, . . . ,ΛL; each list Λl con-
tains nl many items Λl = {I l1, . . . , I lnl}, and the voters are
asked to chose the “best” item on each list. Not every voter
is obliged to vote for the best item on every list, but can
choose to vote on a subset of these lists.
Problem: As the system receives these votes, the task is to
assess:
1. trustworthiness of all voters;
2. level of “community approval” for each item.
In order to make such estimate of the level of “community
approval” robust against possible unfair voting practices of
the participants, the assessment of the trustworthiness of
voters should have the following features (at the moment
we allow these features to be specified both very vaguely
and in a somewhat circular way).
1. voters who vote on a large number of lists, and whose
choices are largely in agreement with the prevailing
sentiment of the community of voters, should obtain
higher level of trustworthiness than the voters who
vote on only a few of these lists, or vote inconsistently
with the prevailing sentiment;
2. voters who seldom vote or voters who vote more or less
randomly, just to be seen as active in the community,
and then choose to vote unfairly on a few particular
lists for their choices which are not favored by the re-
maining voters, should not be able to secure election
of their choices even if such colluding voters are a large
majority for those particular lists.
Note that it is not necessary that the voters vote simul-
taneously for all lists; in fact, the outcomes of voting on all
but one list might have already been determined. We want
to decide the outcome for the latest election using the past
voting pattern of the voters (but NOT the outcomes of the
past voting).
3.2 Vote Aggregation Algorithm
Let us first introduce some notation:
• r → li denotes the fact that voter Vr has participated
in voting for the best object on list Λl and has chosen
item Ii;
• nl denotes the number of items on list l;
• for each item I li on list Λl we will keep track of its
level of community approval at the step of iteration p,
denoted by ρ
(p)
li ;
• these individual community approval levels ρ(p)li will be
collected into a single vector
~ρ = 〈ρli : 1 ≤ l ≤ L, 1 ≤ i ≤ nl〉;
thus, if we let M =
∑
1≤l≤L nl, then ~ρ ∈ RM ;
• we define (~ρ)l to be the projection 〈ρli : 1 ≤ i ≤ nl〉
of ~ρ to the subspace corresponding to a single list Λl.
• for each voter Vr we will also keep track of his trust-
worthiness T
(p)
i at the stage of iteration p.
• for each p ≥ 1 we denote by ‖~x‖p the usual p-norm of
the vector ~x = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉, i.e.,
‖~x‖p =
(
n∑
i=1
x
p
i
) 1
p
.
Algorithm 1 shows our voting algorithm. We now explain
the intuitive motivation behind it. We start with the usual
vote count, where every voter has one, equally worth vote
as every other voter. For each item I li ∈ Λl on a list Λl, the
initial rank ρ
(0)
li of I
l
i is simply the number of votes which
this item has received, normalized so that
∑
j ρ
2
lj = 1. In the
next round of iterative aggregation of the votes, each voter
first gets its trustworthiness rank, which is the sum total of
the ranks of all the items which he has voted for, “prorated”
by a monotonically increasing function f(x) = xα; we will
later explain such choice of f(x).
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Algorithm 1 Adaptive Voting Algorithm
Initialization: Let ε > 0 be the precision threshold, α ≥ 1
a discrimination setting parameter and
T
(0)
i = 1;
ρ
(0)
li =
∑
r : r→li T
(0)
r√∑
1≤j≤nl
(∑
r : r→lj T
(0)
r
)2
=
|{r : r → li}|√∑
1≤j≤nl
|{r : r → lj}|2
.
Repeat:
T
(p+1)
r =
∑
l,i : r→li
ρli; (1)
ρ
(p+1)
li =
∑
r : r→li
(
T
(p+1)
r
)α
√∑
1≤j≤nl
(∑
r : r→lj
(
T
(p+1)
r
)α)2 ; (2)
until: ‖~ρ (p+1) − ~ρ (p)‖2 < ε.
The idea is that now voters themselves can be judged by
the selections they have made; a high trustworthiness rank
will be given only to voters who have often chosen candi-
dates favored by many other members of the community,
thus voting in accordance with the prevailing community
sentiment. Such voters can be considered as “reliable vot-
ers”, choosing candidates in accordance with the community
sentiment. On the other hand, those who badly judge oth-
ers will themselves receive a low trustworthiness rank. We
could not help mentioning that this idea is remarkably old:
“Judge not, and you shall not be judged ...” as well as
“Judge not, that you be not judged” (The New Testament,
Luke 6:37 and Matthew 7:1, respectively).
Now we recalculate the ranks of items using (2); thus each
received vote is now worth the present trustworthiness rank
of the voter giving such vote. We continue such iterations
until the ranks stop changing significantly, i.e., we stop when
‖~ρ (p+1)−~ρ (p)‖2 < ε, where ε is a threshold corresponding to
a desired precision adequate for the particular application;
in our experiments it was in the range 10−6 − 10−12 with
the algorithm terminating after 10− 40 iterations.
The value of the parameter α determines the robustness
of our algorithm against unfair voters. Clearly, higher values
of α increasingly favor voters with a high compliance with
the prevailing community sentiment and penalize harsher for
votes given to less favoured candidates. While this makes
our system more robust, large values of α increasingly
marginalize a significant fraction of honest, but less success-
ful voters. In our experiments the values α < 1.5 were in-
sufficient to obtain satisfactory robustness; the values 1.5 <
α < 3 gave excellent performance without marginalizing a
large number of voters, with the value α = 2 chosen for our
implementation of the MovieTrust (see Section 4).
Our algorithm will eventually terminate with any strictly
increasing, twice continuously differentiable function f(x) in
place of xα, but we saw little value in such choices. As it
will be obvious from the convergence proof below, the choice
f(x) = xα has a natural motivation, defining a commonly
used norm on the vector space of trustworthiness ranks. We
now rigorously prove that our algorithm converges and char-
acterize the values ~ρ which it produces.
3.3 Convergence proof
For a given ‘community approval’ ranking ~ρ of items, re-
ferred in the sequel simply as ranks of items, let us define
the corresponding trustworthiness Tr(~ρ) of a voter Vr as
Tr(~ρ) =
∑
p,k : r→pk
ρpk, (3)
and denote by ~T (~ρ) the vector of such trustworthiness ranks,
~T (~ρ) = 〈T1(~ρ), T2(~ρ), . . . , TN (~ρ)〉; then
‖~T‖α+1 =
(∑
r T
α+1
r (~ρ)
) 1
α+1
is the α+ 1-norm of the vector ~T (~ρ) ∈ RN .
We now wish to assign the ranks to the items ranked so
that:
1. for every list Λl, the vector of ranks of all items on
that list is a unit vector, i.e., ‖(~ρ)l‖2 = 1;
2. the α + 1 norm ‖~T‖α+1 of the trustworthiness vector
T (~ρ) is maximized.
The reason for considering ‖~T (~ρ)‖α+1 rather than ‖~T (~ρ)‖α
in the second condition will be clear below. Note that, in a
sense, this gives “the benefit of the doubt” to all voters, giv-
ing them the largest possible joint trustworthiness rank (in
terms of the α+1 norm of the trustworthiness vector), while
maintaining for each list the same unit 2-norm of the vector
corresponding to ranks of all objects on that list. Thus, if
we now define
F (~ρ) = (‖~T‖α+1)α+1, (4)
then our aim is equivalent to maximizing F (~ρ), subject to
the constraints
C =
{
nl∑
i=1
ρ
2
li = 1, 1 ≤ l ≤ L
}
.
For this purpose we introduce for each list Λl a Lagrangian
multiplier λl, define ~λ = 〈λl, : 1 ≤ l ≤ L〉 and look for the
stationary points of the Lagrangian function
Φ(~ρ,~λ) = F (~ρ)−
L∑
q=1
λq
(
−1 +
nq∑
m=1
ρ
2
qm
)
.
Let l, m be list indices and i, j item indices; then, using
the fact that the trustworthiness functions Tr(~ρ) are linear,
we obtain
∂F (~ρ)
∂ρli
= (α+ 1)
∑
r : r→li
T
α
r (~ρ); (5)
∂Φ(~ρ,~λ)
∂ρli
= (α+ 1)
∑
r : r→li
T
α
r (~ρ)− 2λlρli (6)
∂2F (~ρ)
∂ρli∂ρmj
= α(α+ 1)
∑
r : r→li,mj
T
α−1
r (~ρ). (7)
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Figure 2: A geometric representation of the iterative procedure
Note that, since every voter votes for at most one item on
each list, ∂
2F (~ρ)
∂ρli∂ρlj
= 0 for every l, i, j such that i 6= j. Also,
if (~ρ,~λ) is a stationary point of Φ then ∂Φ(~ρ,
~λ)
∂ρli
= 0 and thus
ρliλl =
α+ 1
2
∑
r : r→li
T
α
r (~ρ). (8)
This yields
ρ
2
liλ
2
l =
(α+ 1)2
4
( ∑
r : r→li
T
α
r (~ρ)
)2
,
and by summing the above equations for all indices i of
objects on the list l we get
λl
2
nl∑
i=1
ρ
2
li =
(α+ 1)2
4
∑
m
( ∑
r : r→lm
T
α
r (~ρ)
)2
.
Since (~ρ,~λ) is a stationary point of Φ also ∂Φ(~ρ,
~λ)
∂λl
= 0; this
implies
∑nl
i=1 ρ
2
li = 1, and since by (8) λl must be positive,
we obtain from the above and from (8)
ρli =
∑
r : r→li T
α
r (~ρ)√∑
m
(∑
r : r→lm T
α
r (~ρ)
)2 . (9)
We now define ~ρ 7→ (~ρ)∗ to be the mapping such that for
an arbitrary ~ρ,
(~ρ)∗li =
∑
r : r→li T
α
r (~ρ)√∑
m
(∑
r : r→lm T
α−1
r (~ρ)
)2 . (10)
Recall that we denote by (~x)l the projection of a vector
~x ∈ RM to the subspace of dimension nl, which corresponds
to a list Λl. Thus, using (5), equations (10) can be written
as
(~ρ ∗)l =
(∇F (~ρ))l
‖(∇F (~ρ))l‖2 . (11)
Consequently, (~σ,~λ) is a stationary point of Φ just in case
~σ∗ = ~σ, i.e., for all 1 ≤ l ≤ L,
(~σ)l =
(∇F (~σ))l
‖(∇F (~σ))l‖2 . (12)
Note also that in our algorithm the approximation ~ρ (n+1)
of the vector ~ρ obtained at the stage of iteration (n+1) can
be written as
~ρ
(n+1) = (~ρ (n))∗,
and that our algorithm will halt when ~ρ (n) get sufficiently
close to a fixed point ~σ = (~σ) ∗ of the mapping ~ρ→ (~ρ) ∗, a
stationary point of the Lagrangian function Φ(~ρ,~λ). As we
will see, such a point ~σ is a constrained local maximum of
F (~ρ), subject to the constraints ‖(~ρ)l‖ = 1, 1 ≤ l ≤ L. Note
that we do not need to prove the uniqueness of such a fixed
point because our final ranks are defined as the outputs of
our algorithm, and we only need to prove that our algorithm
eventually terminates; for this purpose just approaching a
fixed point is sufficient.
Let ~ρ be an arbitrary vector such that ‖(~ρ)l‖2 = 1 for all
1 ≤ l ≤ L; we abbreviate (~ρ)∗ with ~ρ ∗ and let ~h = ~ρ ∗ − ~ρ.
By applying the Taylor formula with the remainder in the
Lagrange form, we get that for some 0 < c < 1 and ~µc =
c~ρ+ (1− c)~ρ ∗ We have
F (~ρ ∗) = F (~ρ+ ~h)
= F (~ρ) +∇F (~ρ) · ~h+ 1
2
∑
l,m,i,j
∂2F (~µc)
∂ρli∂ρmj
hlihmj .
(13)
Since
(~h)l = (~ρ
∗)l − (~ρ)l = (∇F (~ρ))l‖(∇F (~ρ))l‖2 − (~ρ)l, (14)
using also (11), we get
(∇F (~ρ))l · (~h)l = (∇F (~ρ))l ·
(
(∇F (~ρ))l
‖(∇F (~ρ))l‖2 − (~ρ)l
)
= ‖(∇F (~ρ))l‖2 − (∇F (~ρ))l · (~ρ)l
= ‖(∇F (~ρ))l‖2 − ‖(∇F (~ρ))l‖2(~ρ ∗)l · (~ρ)l
= ‖(∇F (~ρ))l‖2(1− (~ρ ∗)l · (~ρ)l)
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Let θl be the angle between the unit vectors (~ρ)l and (~ρ
∗)l,
i.e., such that cos θl = (~ρ)l · ( ~ρ∗)l. Then, (see Figure 2(a))∥∥∥∥∥ (
~h)l
2
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
=
(
sin
θl
2
)2
=
1− cos θl
2
=
1− (~ρ)l · (~ρ∗)l
2
.
Combining the last two formulas we get
(∇F (~ρ))l · (~h)l = ‖(∇F (~ρ))l‖2 ‖(
~h)l‖22
2
. (15)
Assume first that ‖~h‖2 is sufficiently small, so that the con-
tribution of the second order terms in (13) is small compared
to the first order term, and, consequently
F (~ρ ∗) ≈ F (~ρ) +∇F (~ρ) · ~h. (16)
Since ‖∇F (~ρ)‖2 is a continuous function, it achieves its min-
imum on the compact set defined by our constraints, i.e., on
the set C = {~ρ : ‖(~ρ)l‖ = 1, 1 ≤ l ≤ L}. It is easy to
see that the directional derivative of F (~ρ) in the (radial) di-
rection of vector ~ρ is always strictly positive; thus, on the
compact set defined by our constraints its minimum must
also be strictly positive. Thus, there exists κ > 0 such that
‖∇F (~ρ)‖2 > κ for all ~ρ ∈ C; using this and by summing
equations (15) for all 1 ≤ l ≤ L, we get
∇F (~ρ) · ~h > κ ‖
~h‖22
2
. (17)
This and (16) imply that, for ~ρ (n) and ~h (n) = ~ρ (n+1)−~ρ (n)
obtained in our iterations,
F (~ρ (n+1))− F (~ρ (n)) = F ((~ρ (n))∗)− F (~ρ (n)) > κ ‖
~h (n)‖22
2
Consequently, since F (~ρ) must be bounded on a compact
set defined by the constraints C, we get that ‖~h (n)‖22 must
converge to zero, i.e., ‖~ρ (n) − (~ρ (n))∗‖2 will eventually be
smaller than the prescribed threshold and the algorithm will
terminate.
If ‖~h‖2 is not sufficiently small so that the impact of the
second order term in (13) makes the inequality (17) false,
we supplement our algorithm with an initial phase which
involves a line search. While this ensures a provable conver-
gence of our algorithm, in all of our (very numerous) exper-
iments such a line search was never activated; however, we
were unable to prove without any additional assumptions
that indeed such line search is superfluous, so we present a
slight modification of our algorithm. Let
f(~ρ, t) = F (~ρ+ t(~ρ ∗ − ~ρ));
then, by the previous considerations, for sufficiently small
t function f(~ρ (n), t) is increasing in t. We now modify our
iteration step as follows. If there exists t0 ∈ (0, 1) such that
∂f
∂t
(~ρ, t0) = 0 (testing this amounts to solving a low degree
algebraic equation), then we let ~ρ (n+1) = ~ρ ′, where ~ρ ′ is
defined so that for all 1 ≤ l ≤ L, and for the smallest root
t0 of the above equation,
(~ρ ′)l =
(~ρ (n))l + t0((~ρ
(n) ∗)l − (~ρ (n))l)
‖(~ρ (n))l + t0((~ρ (n) ∗)l − (~ρ (n))l)‖2 ;
see Figure 2(b); if no such t0 exists, we let
~ρ
(n+1) = (~ρ (n))∗.
The convergence now follows from an argument similar to
the one in the previous case.
3.4 Rating Through Voting Procedure
We now describe how we use the proposed voting algo-
rithm in online rating systems.
Our rating procedure starts by assigning to each product
πl, 1 ≤ l ≤ L, a voting list Λl; the items on each voting
list are the rating levels, comprising a “scale” from 1 to n,
(in practice n ≤ 10). Each rater is now construed as a
voter Vr, (1 ≤ r ≤ N). We then process cast evaluations,
by interpreting an evaluation of level i, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), of a
product πl, (1 ≤ l ≤ L), by a voter Vr, as his vote for item i
on the list Λl. After our iterative algorithm has terminated,
each level 1 ≤ i ≤ n on each voting list Λl has received a
corresponding credibility degree ρli.
We can now obtain a rating score R(πl) of each product
πl, using such credibility degrees (~ρ)l = 〈ρ1, . . . , ρn〉 in a way
which suits the particular application best. For example, if
the rating scores have to reflect where the community sen-
timent is centered, we can simply choose as the rating score
R(πl) of πl the rating level which has the highest credibility
rank. Such a rating score does not involve any averaging
and is most indicative of the community’s prevailing senti-
ment. On the other hand, if we wish to obtain a score which
emphasises such prevailing sentiment, but, to a varying de-
gree takes into account “dissenting views”, one can form a
weighted average of the form
R(πl) =
∑
1≤i≤nl
ρ
p
li × i∑
1≤j≤nl
ρ
p
lj
.
where p ≥ 1 is a parameter. As p increases, such rank con-
verges to the previous, “maximum credibility” rank, while
for smaller values of p we obtain a significant averaging ef-
fect. In our implementations and testing of the MovieTrust
we have used p = 2.
4. IMPLEMENTATION
4.1 Application Scenario
One of the most popular rating scenarios on the web is
movie rating. There are several movie rating systems which
allow their users to rate movies and post their reviews.
Based on users’ evaluations of the movies, a system can cal-
culate a rating score for every movie. Such rating scores are
usually some forms of average of the evaluations posted by
users. For example, IMDb is one of the best known online
movie rating systems. It uses an algorithm for calculating
rating scores for movies which the web site owners do not dis-
close, wishing, as they declare, to keep it effective, but they
explicitly say that their ranks are a weighted average [14].
Another movie rating and recommending system is Movie-
Lens [25] provided by GroupLens research lab at the Uni-
versity of Minnesota [11]. MovieLens uses a collaborative
filtering method to recommend movies to its users, based
on their personal preferences. In this paper we test our sys-
tem using a partial copy of MovieLens data obtained form
GroupLens website [26]. The dataset contains 855598 rat-
ing scores cast by 2113 users on nearly 10000 movies. This
dataset for every movie also contains the corresponding rat-
ing score given by the top critics of Rotten Tomatoes movie
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Figure 3: Screen shot showing application of the
MovieTrust Chrome Extension
rating website [30], another well known movie rating system
which we also use for comparison purposes.
4.2 MovieTrust
To test our methodology, we have designed and imple-
mented a movie rating system, which we call MovieTrust,
aiming to robustly calculate rating scores for movies. Movi-
eTrust comprises of three components. One is the rating
calculation engine, the backbone of the application, which
calculates the rating scores based on locally stored data.
The second component is an API which makes MovieTrust
services available to users all around the Internet. The third
component is an extension for the Google Chrome browser.
At the moment, this extension is developed specifically for
IMDb website.
When theMovieTrust extension is installed on the Chrome
browser and the users visit IMDb page of a movie, the Movi-
eTrust icon will appear on the right corner of the address bar
and users can simply click on it and see what rating score
has been calculated for that movie by our system. Figure 4.2
shows a screen shot of MovieTrust extension on the Chrome
browser.
The MovieTrust has a website [27] which provides all re-
lated information about the tool. The extension is available
for download, to allow easy evaluation of the performance
of our system and comparison with the well known movie
ratings system, IMDb.
5. EVALUATION
We evaluate two aspects of the performance of our method:
robustness against unfair evaluations and the accuracy of
calculated rating scores.
5.1 Evaluating Robustness
We use three scenarios to evaluate the robustness of our
method.
5.1.1 Evaluation Scenarios
Scenario 1. We start evaluation of our system with a very
simple example, which nevertheless illustrates the heuris-
tics which was the starting point for our algorithm. Ta-
ble 1(a) shows the votes cast by 5 voters (r1, . . . , r5) on 5
items (I1, . . . , I5) in 6 different elections (Λ1, . . . ,Λ6). For
example, the first row shows that in the first election r1, r2
and r3 have voted for I1 and r4 and r5 have voted for I2.
In the usual election model, in the last election I1 must
win because it has received 3 votes out of 5. However, when
we look at the history of the voters’ choices, r2 and r3, who
have voted for I2 in last election, have voted for the winners
in all past elections. This means that they have been always
behaving close to community consensus. On the other hand
r1, r4 and r5 who have voted for I1 do not conform to com-
munity consensus in most of the past elections. Therefore,
we can argue that in the last election the I2 should win,
despite of the fact that the majority have voted for I1.
Table 1(b) shows the results of running our model on data
provided in Table 1(a). During initialisation of our algo-
rithm, item I1 receives initial rank of
3√
32+22
≈ 0.83 while
I2 receives initial rank of
2√
32+22
≈ 0.55. However, the
final ranks obtained after 16 iterations, shown in table 1(b),
are 0.2 and 0.98 respectively; thus, I2 wins the last election
despite of the majority voting for I1.
Scenario 2. In the second scenario, we use synthetic data
to show how robust our system is against unfair evalua-
tions such as collusion. Our new dataset contains 60 vot-
ers voting in 7 elections, with each election list having 8
items (I1, . . . , I8). First 15 voters are “honest voters” who
do not cast unfair evaluations. We generate these users and
their corresponding votes by replicating voters r1 to r5 three
times to generate 15 honest voters (r1, . . . , r15). We also gen-
erate 45 voters who make random choices in all elections, ex-
cept the last one. In the last, 7th election, the unfair voters
collude in order to manipulate the outcome of the election,
trying to secure election of item I5. On the other hand,
all 15 honest voters vote for I1.
Thus, we have 6 elections in each of which 1
4
of all voters
cast their evaluations according the pattern in scenario 1,
while 3
4
of all voters cast random votes, and one election in
which the collusion attack happens. Note that the number
of “unfair” voters is 3 times the number of fair voters. In a
normal election scenario, it is obvious that in the last elec-
tion item I5 would win, having received 3 times the number
of votes of its opponent I1. In our method, during the ini-
tialisation process, item I1, having obtained 15 votes, gets
the initial ranking score 15√
152+452
≈ 0.32 and item I5, hav-
ing obtained 45 votes gets an initial score of 45√
152+452
≈ .95.
However, after we run our algorithm (which terminates af-
ter 16 iterations) the scores are essentially reversed and I1
wins the election, having obtained credibility degree ≈ 0.96
versus the credibility degree ≈ 0.28 obtained by I2. Such an
outcome is to be expected from a robust voting system. Fig-
ure 5.1.1 shows the ranks produced by our algorithm, and,
for comparison, in the last column, the initial ranks based
on (normalized) simple vote counting.
Scenario 3. In this scenario, we use real world evaluation
results, from the MovieLens dataset. We inject different lev-
els of collusion attacks to the dataset and check robustness
of our method. We also compare the performance of our
method with two commonly used rating models: Averag-
ing and Majority. We are aware that there are many recent
methods which try to calculate rating scores after detecting
and eliminating unfair evaluations such as [28] or [39]. How-
ever, it should be noted that in the presence of the massive
collusion attacks which we inject to dataset, the control of
the products would inevitably be given to the colluders. All
existing collusion detection systems use majority as a pri-
mary indicator, such as [17], or as a secondary indicator to
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Table 1: A simple example for showing impact of voter trustworthiness on election result(Scenario 1).
9(a) dataset.
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳❳
9Election
9Voter
r1 r1 r1 r1 r1
Λ1 1 1 1 2 2
Λ2 1 2 2 3 2
Λ3 3 4 4 4 2
Λ4 1 3 3 3 1
Λ5 2 2 2 1 1
Λ6 1 2 2 1 1
9(b) Results
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳❳
9Item
9Election
Λ1 Λ2 Λ3 Λ4 Λ5 Λ6
I1 0.99 0.08 0 0.11 0.11 0.20
I2 0.11 0.99 0.03 0 0.99 0.98
I3 0 0.09 0.08 0.99 0 0
I4 0 0 1 0 0 0
I5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2: The Results of running our model in the presence of a large number of colluders (Scenario 2).
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳❳
Item
Election
Λ1 Λ2 Λ3 Λ4 Λ5 Λ6 Λ7 (INITIAL)
I1 0.9561 0.1662 0.0226 0.2787 0.2812 0.4542 0.9586 0.3162
I2 0.2714 0.9646 0.1290 0.0334 0.9569 0.8840 0
I3 0.0130 0.1795 0.1742 0.9556 0.0469 0.0315 0
I4 0.0503 0.0089 0.9731 0.0270 0.0248 0.0402 0
I5 0.0028 0.0572 0.0164 0.0606 0.0175 0.0624 0.2846 0.9486
I6 0.0490 0.0453 0.0235 0.0205 0.0351 0.0603 0
I7 0.0812 0.0638 0.0207 0.0180 0.0272 0.0386 0
I8 0.0164 0.0078 0.0649 0.0519 0.0069 0.0200 0
tune their primary indicators such as [28] or [39]. Therefore,
they must fail when the number of unfair votes is far larger
than the number of the fair ones. This explains our choice
of methods used for comparison with our method.
To evaluate methods, we calculate a rating score for each
movie from the data set used by applying ours, Averaging
and Majority methods. We then add collusion attacks to
the dataset and recalculate rating scores of movies and find
the difference between new ranks and the old ranks. To
quantify this differences for each method in each run, we
calculate the ‘Root-Mean-Square (RMS)’ of the differences
between new ranks and old ranks for all movies.
To demonstrate the robustness of our system, we try to
promote all movies which have very low rating scores, i.e.,
movies which majority of users have given a rating score
lower than 3, by posting evaluations with values of 10 to
sharply increase their rating scores. We also try to demote
all movies having a very high rating score, i.e., movies with
a rating score higher than 8 from the majority of raters, by
injecting evaluations with value of 1 to sharply decrease the
rating scores of such movies. For each movie to be promoted
or demoted we inject different levels of collusion attacks,
ranging from 0% to 200%. We then compare the RMS values
of the differences to show how these three methods behave
in the presence of such attacks.
Suppose that for a movie Λl, ml evaluations have been
posted by real world users. To test our method with a col-
lusion attack of size 200% of the number of the real, already
existing votes, we inject 2×ml votes which try to promote
or demote the product, as explained above. This clearly
creates a massive collusion attack on the product (here a
movie) which sharply changes the majority consensus to-
ward unfair evaluations, thus making every existing method
likely to fail.
Figure 4(a), shows the results of injecting collusion at-
tacks in order to promote low ranked movies. As shown in
the chart, the Majority model is highly vulnerable against
unfair votes; its corresponding evaluation level and thus the
corresponding RMS error is sharply increased to the highest
possible value and remains steady at that level. The averag-
ing model performs better, but nevertheless its RMS error
steadily increases as more unfair evaluations are added. The
RMS of our method is extremely small, increasing slightly as
the number of unfair evaluations gets close to 200%, never
getting close to serious malfunctioning, in sharp contrast
with other two methods.
Likewise, Figure 4(b) shows that our model behaves well
also in the presence of a massive demoting collusion. While
the RMS for our method is around 1, the Majority model
jumps immediately to the highest possible level and Aver-
aging model steadily moving towards the unfair evaluations.
The reason why the RMS error of our method is larger
in the presence of demoting attacks is that for high ranked
movies the total number of existing votes is much larger than
the number of votes for low ranking movies targeted in pro-
moting attacks. Consequently the number of injected collu-
sive votes in the case of demoting attacks is much larger; for
some movies the number of collusive votes exceeded 5000
which accounts for higher overall impact on the system’s
RMS value. However, even with such extreme collusion at-
tacks, our system is remarkably robust.
5.1.2 Discussion
We tested our system by generating groups of voters with
various types of voting patterns. Our experiments show that
as the number of elections increases, so does the robustness
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Figure 4: Comparison of behavior of three methods in the presence of different levels of injected collusion
attacks (Scenario 3)
of the system, as expected. The reason is that the larger
the number of elections, the harder it is to manipulate our
“globally obtained” trustworthiness ranks, in which the rank
of any voter depends on ranks of all other voters. Also,
as the number of items on lists increases, the possibility of
casting same random votes of several voters decreases and
consequently the system performs more robustly. Thus, in
order to skew a particular election, colluding voters need a
long history of “honest looking” activity, or a long history
of massive collusion attacks gone undetected by other, more
standard methods of collusion detection which can be used
in conjunction with our method, or if the attackers actually
manage to change the sentiment of the community.
To summarize, the followings are the possible scenarios
in which colluders might be able to manipulate result of an
election:
• Colluders build up a large team of voters. All these
voters must vote over rather long period of time in ac-
cordance with community sentiment in order to earn
hight trustworthiness ranks and then attempt to ma-
nipulate a particular election. This team must be large
enough to be able to dominate others while trying to
promote or demote a product. This is unlikely to hap-
pen because research [28,39] show that collusion hap-
pens in a short period of time and only on a few num-
ber of elections. In online rating systems, with millions
of members and products, it is quite hard to collect a
large fraction of members and encourage them to rate
most of the existing products in the system honestly
for a long period of time and then ask them to rate a
particular product as the collusion team intends.
• The second possibility is to build a very large group
of colluders and manipulate all elections in the sys-
tem to change the sentiment of the community toward
intension of collusion team. In this case since the com-
munity sentiment is toward collusion party, the honest
voters will be marginalized and eventually their im-
pact will be eliminated. This might be possible for
small communities with a small number of members
and items. It is obvious that it is quite impossible to
run this scenario in a huge online rating system like
Amazon or IMDb, and that such behavior would go
undetected by other, relatively simple collusion detec-
tion methods which easily detect such long stretches
of extreme behavior and which can be deployed in par-
allel, with minimal additional complexity and cost of
the system.
5.2 Evaluating Accuracy of Results
5.2.1 Evaluation Scenario
To evaluate our model we need some ‘gold standards’ or
ground truth levels to compare our calculated rating scores
with and check how they deviate from such gold standards.
Product rating is usually is a subjective task, i.e., the result
of evaluating a product is strongly related to the personal
interest and experiments of the evaluator. This subjective-
ness even is getting more serious when a movie is evaluated.
It is impossible to evaluate a movie automatically and find
its real quality level and compare it with our scores. On the
other hand, people have different tastes and interests and
the rating scores they give to a movie sometimes may be in
contrast. So, it is not possible to ask a few people to watch
a movie and provide us a reliable rating score for the movie
as a ground truth level.
To solve this problem, we rely on rating scores calculated
by two well-known existing movie rating systems. The first
one is IMDb. The IMDb calculates a rating score for every
movie using many parameters such as the age of the voter,
the value of the posted rating score, the distribution of the
votes, etc. IMDb does not disclose its method of calculating
ratings, but the success of the website in the long run is a
good indication that the calculated rating scores are realistic
and reliable. We extracted the rating score of every movie
from IMDb.
The second gold standard which we use is the rating scores
given to movies by top critics in Rotten Tomatoes (referred
as RTCritics in followings) movie ranking website. The crit-
ics are better informed and experienced than an average
user. Although they might have their own personal inter-
ests, the community of critics as domain experts can provide
dependable ratings of movies. We extracted the top critics’
movie rating scores from the MovieLens dataset, as we have
explained in application scenario (see Section 4.1).
First, we compare ranking scores calculated in three mod-
els. We have more than 9000 movies in our database. We
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Figure 5: Average rating scores calculated for movies using three models: MovieTrust, IMDb and RTCritics
have RTCritics ranks only for about 4000 movies but this is
still too large to fit into a readable chart. So, for every 100
movies we calculate the average score (mean). Note that
this is done only to make graphical representation of rating
scores of more than 4000 moves feasible; the RMS values of
the changes due to collusion attacks calculated in the previ-
ous subsection are obtained from the entire dataset, without
any averaging. We use such calculated averages to compare
our rating scores with those provided by IMDb and Rotten
Tomatoes. Figure 5 shows the result of this comparison. In
general, our scores are higher than RTCritics and very close
to the scores obtained from IMDb. The “harsher” ratings
from Rotten Tomatoes are to be expected from a community
described aptly by the label ‘the critics’. Moreover, not only
do our ratings conform to the ratings from IMDb, but also
when our ratings do differ, the difference is nearly always
towards the rating scores provided by RTCritics.
5.2.2 Discussion
The accuracy evaluation results explicitly show that the
results obtained by our system are very close to the rating
scores calculated by IMDb and RTCritics. The slight differ-
ences between our method and other two are accounted for
by the following reasons. These three rankings are based on
three different dataset: MovieLens (the dataset we used),
IMDb dataset and Rotten Tomatoes dataset; despite the
fact that the number of samples in all of these data sets
is sufficiently large to expect the same statistical features,
small differences still would occur, most notably because the
rating scores calculated by our model are based on a dataset
which holds evaluation data only up to 2009.
More important is a high degree of similarity of the plots
of the ranks produced by these three systems, see Figure 5,
strongly supporting the dictum that “the wisdom of the
crowd is reliable”, see [33], in the sense that finding the com-
munity sentiment on the quality of a product is at least as
dependable and, in all likelihood, more dependable than any
other kind of metrics, such as various averages and the simi-
lar. This we explain by the fact that our system compensates
for anomalous behavior of voters as well as for natural diver-
sity of opinions, allowing detection of the true sentiment of
the community, doing this without an external supervision
or an explicit “0-1” classification of voters according to their
perceived reliability.
In all practical systems the evaluations submitted by the
participants are on a coarse granularity involving at most
ten levels or less. Given the large number of voters, and rel-
atively small number of ‘bins’ in which their votes for each
product can be placed, insures that real sentiment of the
community will be captured by the emerging set of voters
with high trustworthiness ranks. This insures high efficiency
of our method, especially for very large online rating sys-
tems, for which trust management is both of the highest
importance and one of the most challenging problems.
6. RELATED WORK
As demonstrated in [37], as the rating systems get more
and more popular and more users rely on them to decide
on purchases from online stores, the temptation to obtain
fake rating scores for products or fake reputation scores for
people has dramatically increased. To detect such reviews,
Mukherjee et.al., [28] propose a model for spotting fake re-
view groups in online rating systems. The model analyzes
textual feedbacks cast on products in Amazon online market
to find collusion groups. They employ FIM [1] algorithm to
identify candidate collusion groups and then use 8 indicators
to identify colluders. In [23] authors assign every review a
degree of spam value, and based on these values they iden-
tify most suspicious users and investigate their behavior to
find most likely colluders. In [18] authors try to identify fake
reviews by looking for unusual patterns in posted reviews.
In a more general setup, collusion detection has been stud-
ied in P2P and reputation management systems; good sur-
veys can be found in [6] and [32]. EigenTrust [19] is a well
known algorithm proposed to produce collusion free repu-
tation scores; however, authors in [22] demonstrate that it
is not robust against collusion. Another series of works [24,
38, 39] use a set of signals and alarms to point to a sus-
picious behavior. The most famous of all, the PageRank
algorithm [29] was also devised to prevent collusive groups
from building fake ranks for pages on the web.
Iterative methods for trust evaluation and ranking have
been pioneered in [20,41]. Some of the ideas from these pa-
pers were among the staring points of [7–9], as the authors
mention; the proof techniques which we used in this paper
were inspired by the techniques developed in [7]. However,
our present method sharply differs from all of these prior
iterative methods by virtue of entirely decoupling the credi-
bility assessment from the score aggregation. More precisely,
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the main idea used in [20, 41] and in [7–9] is to produce at
each stage of iteration an approximation of the final rat-
ings of the objects and then calculate for each rater the
degree of her “belief divergence” from such calculated ap-
proximations, i.e., calculate some distance measure between
her proposed ranks and these approximations of the final
ranks of objects. In the subsequent round of iteration a
new approximation of the ranks of all objects is obtained
as a weighted average of the ranks proposed by raters, with
the weight given to each rater’s rank inversely related to
her corresponding distance from the approximate final ranks
obtained in the previous round of iteration. Thus, in this
manner, the ranks of objects are produced simultaneously
with an assessment of the trustworthiness of the raters as
reflected in the weights given to their proposed ranks.
In contrast, our iterative method operates only on credi-
bility assessment of raters and on the levels of the commu-
nity approval of items, which are obtained without using
the fact that the items voted on are rating levels. In fact,
as it is obvious from our algorithm, we have never used any
comparisons of the proposed rating levels or even any or-
dering of the rating levels. We only rely on the levels of
concurrence of the opinions of raters. Thus, our system can
subsequently choose how to use such estimates of the ‘com-
munity sentiment’ to produce the aggregate rating scores of
items.
The second author and his co-authors, unaware of the pi-
oneering work in [7–9,20,41], have proposed in [13] a fixed-
point algorithm for trust evaluation in online communities
and subsequently in [2] an algorithm for aggregating assign-
ment marks given by multiple assessors. This method was
later applied to aggregation of sensor readings in wireless
sensor networks, in the presence of sensor faults [5]. He
also proposed the idea of applying an iterative procedure
for vote aggregation to his collaborators in [21]; however
no proof of convergence of the method was provided there,
and, more importantly, the proposed method had some se-
rious shortcomings. In the notation of the present paper,
denoting again the total number of voters by N and total
number of voting lists by L, the recursion for computing the
trustworthiness Tr of a rater Vr proposed in [21] was given
by
T
(n+1)
r =
1
L
∑
l,i
(∑
m :m,r→li T
(n)
m∑N
m=1 T
(n)
m
) p
p+1
.
Unfortunately, the normalizing factor in the denominator
on the righthand side can become excessive as the num-
ber of voters who did not vote in any elections in which Vr
has voted increases, making the rank computation unsta-
ble. Also, the exponent p
p+1
is always smaller than 1, and
this severely limits the robustness of the proposed method
against collusion attacks. The algorithm aimed to relate
(a power of) the ratios between trustworthiness of any two
voters to the ratios of the numbers of votes received by the
candidates chosen by these voters. It also normalized the
trustworthiness of voters, instead of normalizing the credi-
bility of levels; however, as we do it in our present algorithm,
normalizing credibility of levels, which are going to be used
as weights in a subsequent (independent) computation of
ranks of objects, not only makes more sense but also allows
an elegant proof of convergence, missing in [21].
In summary, unlike the existing models for collusion de-
tection, we do NOT rely on any clustering techniques, local
indicators or averaging; also, our method does not rely on
any approximation of the final rating scores, making rating
an entirely independent process from the credibility assess-
ment.
7. CONCLUSION
As we have mentioned, existing iterative methods, such
as [7–9, 20, 41], approximate ranks using techniques involv-
ing weighted averages. However, averages generally have the
propensity to blur statistical features because they smooth
out data. In our method, the trustworthiness of raters is
computed purely from the concurrence of opinions, with-
out any averaging at all. In fact, note that in our “rating-
through-voting” method, the ordering of the range of cred-
ibility levels (i.e., an increasing ordering from e.g., 1 to 10)
is NOT considered at all - we treat such domain as an un-
ordered set, and only consider the concurrence of opinions.
Such obtained trustworthiness of raters and the credibility
of items (in this case rating levels) can then be used to ob-
tain the values of the rating scores in a completely decoupled
way, for example, by taking a weighted average with weights
obtained as some function of the credibility scores obtained
for each rating level, or by choosing the highest ranked level
or many other possible ways, depending on what kind of
statistical feature we are mining the submitted evaluation
data.
However, in our future work, we will further refine our
method by taking into account the ordering of the rating
levels, with the aim to produce a complete yet fully flexible
rating methodology which can be precisely tuned to pro-
duce rating scores reflecting any desired statistical feature
of evaluation data.
8. REFERENCES
[1] R. Agrawal and R. Srikant. Fast algorithms for mining
association rules in large databases. In Proceedings of
the 20th International Conference on Very Large Data
Bases, VLDB ’94, pages 487–499, San Francisco, CA,
USA, 1994. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc.
[2] P. C. C. C. Aleks Ignjatovic, Chung Tong Lee and
H. Guo. Computing marks from multiple assessors
using adaptive averaging. In ICEE, 2009.
[3] Amazon-Online-Market. http://www.amazon.com/.
[4] D. Brabham. Crowdsourcing as a model for problem
solving an introduction and cases. Convergence: The
International Journal of Research into New Media
Technologies, 14(1):75–90, 2008.
[5] C. Chou, A. Ignjatovic and, and W. Hu. Efficient
computation of robust average of compressive sensing
data in wireless sensor networks in the presence of
sensor faults. Parallel and Distributed Systems, IEEE
Transactions on, PP(99):1, 2012.
[6] G. Ciccarelli and R. L. Cigno. Collusion in
peer-to-peer systems. Computer Networks, 55(15):3517
– 3532, 2011.
[7] C. De Kerchove and P. Van Dooren. Iterative filtering
for a dynamical reputation system. Arxiv preprint
arXiv:0711.3964, 2007.
[8] C. De Kerchove and P. Van Dooren. Reputation
systems and optimization. Siam News, 41(2), 2008.
11
[9] C. de Kerchove and P. Van Dooren. Iterative filtering
in reputation systems. SIAM J. Matrix Anal. Appl.,
31(4):1812–1834, Mar. 2010.
[10] A. Doan, R. Ramakrishnan, and A. Y. Halevy.
Crowdsourcing systems on the world-wide web.
Commun. ACM, 54:86–96, April 2011.
[11] GroupLens-Research-Lab. http://www.grouplens.org/.
[12] A. HARMON. Amazon glitch unmasks war of
reviewers. In NY Times (2004, Feb. 14).
[13] A. Ignjatovic, N. Foo, and C. T. Lee. An analytic
approach to reputation ranking of participants in
online transactions. In Proceedings of the 2008
IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web
Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume
01, pages 587–590, Washington, DC, USA, 2008.
IEEE Computer Society.
[14] IMDB-Rating-Explanation.
https://resume.imdb.com/help/show leaf?votes.
[15] Internet-Movie-DataBase. http://www.imdb.com/.
[16] J. M. J. Brown. Reputation in online auctions: The
market for trust. CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT
REVIEW, 49(1):61 –81, Fall 2006.
[17] W. Jianshu, M. Chunyan, and G. Angela. An
entropy-based approach to protecting rating systems
from unfair testimonies. IEICE TRANSACTIONS on
Information and Systems, 89(9):2502–2511, 2006.
[18] N. Jindal, B. Liu, and E.-P. Lim. Finding unusual
review patterns using unexpected rules. In Proceedings
of the 19th ACM international conference on
Information and knowledge management, CIKM ’10,
pages 1549–1552, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
[19] S. D. Kamvar, M. T. Schlosser, and H. Garcia-Molina.
The eigentrust algorithm for reputation management
in p2p networks. In Proceedings of the 12th
international conference on World Wide Web, WWW
’03, pages 640–651, New York, NY, USA, 2003. ACM.
[20] P. Laureti, L. Moret, Y. Zhang, and Y. Yu.
Information filtering via iterative refinement. EPL
(Europhysics Letters), 75:1006, 2006.
[21] C. T. Lee, E. M. Rodrigues, G. Kazai,
N. Milic-Frayling, and A. Ignjatovic. Model for voter
scoring and best answer selection in community q&a
services. Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent
Technology, IEEE/WIC/ACM International
Conference on, 1:116–123, 2009.
[22] Q. Lian, Z. Zhang, M. Yang, B. Y. Zhao, Y. Dai, and
X. Li. An empirical study of collusion behavior in the
maze p2p file-sharing system. In Proceedings of the
27th International Conference on Distributed
Computing Systems, ICDCS ’07, pages 56–,
Washington, DC, USA, 2007. IEEE Computer Society.
[23] E.-P. Lim, V.-A. Nguyen, N. Jindal, B. Liu, and
H. W. Lauw. Detecting product review spammers
using rating behaviors. In Proceedings of the 19th
ACM international conference on Information and
knowledge management, CIKM ’10, pages 939–948,
New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
[24] Y. Liu, Y. Yang, and Y. Sun. Detection of collusion
behaviors in online reputation systems. In Signals,
Systems and Computers, 2008 42nd Asilomar
Conference on, pages 1368–1372. IEEE, 2008.
[25] MovieLens. http://movielens.org/.
[26] MovieLens-dataset.
http://www.grouplens.org/node/73/.
[27] MovieTrust.
http://www.cse.unsw.edu.au/ mallahbakhsh/mtrust/.
[28] A. Mukherjee, B. Liu, and N. Glance. Spotting fake
reviewer groups in consumer reviews. In Proceedings of
the 21st international conference on World Wide Web,
WWW ’12, pages 191–200, New York, NY, USA,
2012. ACM.
[29] L. Page, S. Brin, R. Motwani, and T. Winograd. The
pagerank citation ranking: Bringing order to the web.
Technical Report 1999-66, Stanford InfoLab,
November 1999. Previous number =
SIDL-WP-1999-0120.
[30] Rotten-Tomatoes. http://www.rottentomatoes.com/.
[31] StackOverflow. http://stackoverflow.com.
[32] Y. Sun and Y. Liu. Security of online reputation
systems: The evolution of attacks and defenses. Signal
Processing Magazine, IEEE, 29(2):87 –97, march 2012.
[33] J. Surowiecki. The Wisdom of Crowds. Anchor Books,
2005.
[34] G. Swamynathan, K. Almeroth, and B. Zhao. The
design of a reliable reputation system. Electronic
Commerce Research, 10:239–270, 2010.
10.1007/s10660-010-9064-y.
[35] L. von Ahn and L. Dabbish. Designing games with a
purpose. Commun. ACM, 51:58–67, August 2008.
[36] J. Vuurens and A. de Vries. Obtaining high-quality
relevance judgments using crowdsourcing. Internet
Computing, IEEE, PP(99):1, 2012.
[37] G. Wang, C. Wilson, X. Zhao, Y. Zhu, M. Mohanlal,
H. Zheng, and B. Y. Zhao. Serf and turf: crowdturfing
for fun and profit. In Proceedings of the 21st
international conference on World Wide Web, WWW
’12, pages 679–688, New York, NY, USA, 2012. ACM.
[38] Y. Yang, Q. Feng, Y. L. Sun, and Y. Dai. Reptrap: a
novel attack on feedback-based reputation systems. In
Proceedings of the 4th international conference on
Security and privacy in communication netowrks,
SecureComm ’08, pages 8:1–8:11, New York, NY,
USA, 2008. ACM.
[39] Y.-F. Yang, Q.-Y. Feng, Y. Sun, and Y.-F. Dai.
Dishonest behaviors in online rating systems: cyber
competition, attack models, and attack generator. J.
Comput. Sci. Technol., 24(5):855–867, Sept. 2009.
[40] Yelp. http://www.yelp.com.
[41] Y.-K. Yu, Y.-C. Zhang, P. Laureti, and L. Moret.
Decoding information from noisy, redundant, and
intentionally distorted sources. Physica A: Statistical
Mechanics and its Applications, 371(2):732 – 744,
2006.
[42] M.-C. Yuen, L.-J. Chen, and I. King. A survey of
human computation systems. In Computational
Science and Engineering, 2009. CSE ’09. International
Conference on, volume 4, pages 723 –728, aug. 2009.
12
